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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     This appeal by four present and former inmates of the 
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI- 
Huntingdon) (collectively "Inmates"), presents a troublesome 
question relating to the provision of adequate facilities for 
religious worship in a prison environment.  The inmates, Elwood 
Small, Eric Baynes, Brian Ross and Lawrence Ellison, members of 
the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, sued prison officials under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by providing only one Muslim worship service in 
their prison for all Muslim sects.  They filed suit pro se in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania on July 30, 1993.  In their briefs filed in the 
district court opposing the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the Inmates asserted for the first time an alternative 
claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA 
or Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
     The district court, adopting the Report and Recommendation 
of a magistrate judge, found that the prison officials did not 
violate the Inmates' First Amendment rights because the officials 
provided sufficient alternative means for Muslim worship.  
Further, the court found that the Inmates' RFRA claim was 
untimely.  It noted, however, that the Inmates' claim did not 
implicate the Act.  The Inmates filed a timely appeal to this 
court.  We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
 
                                I. 
     The Inmates are members of the Sunni Muslim religion, one 
of five organized groups of practicing Muslims at SCI- 
Huntingdon.  The prison provides Jummah and Taleem services for 
all the approximately two hundred Muslim inmates.  All Muslim 
sects are invited to attend services, and generally upon arrival 
at services in the chapel separate into groups.   
     The Inmates requested separate space for religious services 
for Sunni Muslims, claiming that there are fundamental 
differences between the Muslim sects that prevent them from 
worshiping together in one service.  The Sunni Muslim sect at 
SCI-Huntingdon approximates 75 in number and is one of the two 
largest at the institution.  The Inmates claim that several empty 
rooms are available at the prison at times when they wish to 
worship, that they are one of the larger Muslim sects in the 
installation, and that the institution could allow them to use 
one of the available rooms without excessive expense or 
additional security.  They contend that the differences between 
the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and the other Muslim sects can be 
compared to the differences between Catholics and Protestants, 
who are provided facilities for separate services at Huntingdon.  
They also assert that Pennsylvania provides separate facilities 
for Sunni Muslim services at other maximum security prisons. 
     Prison officials denied the request, stating that the 
institution did not have the space or the resources to 
accommodate separate worship services.  Further, the officials 
asserted that they had consulted an expert in the Muslim faith 
who informed them that Muslim belief permits a combined worship 
service of various sects.   
     The Inmates submitted numerous unsworn written statements 
by prisoners asserting that the teachings of the institution's 
current Muslim worship service leader are in direct contradiction 
to their faith.  They assert that the Sunni Muslim religion 
mandates adherence to the four "Schools of Thought," and that 
they may not be led in prayer by anyone who does not subscribe to 
these doctrines.   The unsworn declarations stated: "If I choose 
to attend Jummah Services, I am required to practice it under the 
teachings and practices ([e.g.,] language, Dress Code and 
teachings of Iman Wallace Deem Muhammad) which are in direct 
conflict with the four (4) School's [sic] of Thought of the Sunni 
Muslim Brotherhood."   
      In their brief opposing the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the Inmates asserted that there are several unused 
areas in the Huntingdon institution that could be used for 
services on Fridays without burdening the State, and that the 
prison's security staff had been increased.  Further, they 
contend that the policy at SCI-Huntingdon violates RFRA.   
     The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants.  The court maintained that the Inmates provided no 
support for their allegations, and thus accepted the defendants' 
version of the facts as true.  It held that the defendants had a 
legitimate penological interest in denying the Inmates space for 
a separate Sunni Muslim service, finding that the institution 
lacked sufficient funds and staffing to provide the services.  
Further, the court noted that prison officials had consulted with 
an expert in the Muslim religion, who informed the officials that 
all Muslims are united as one regardless of "personal" 
designations such as Sunni Muslim.   
     The court also held that the Inmates may not assert their 
claim under RFRA because they did not raise it in their 
pleadings.  They sought reconsideration and moved the court to 
vacate its judgment to permit them to amend their complaint and 
add a claim under RFRA.  The district court denied the motion.  
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Inmates' claim did not 
implicate the Act because the State did not burden their exercise 
of religion. 
 
                               II. 
     The district court's grant of summary judgment is subject 
to plenary review.  See Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 
F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). 
     The threshold and critical question here is the proper 
standard of review to be applied in addressing prisoners' 
constitutional claims.  We also must appropriately consider the 
policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints first 
set forth by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396 (1974), partially overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 
401 (1989).  There the Court recognized that "the problems of 
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and more to the 
point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree." 
Id. at 404-05.  Over a decade later, the Supreme Court not only 
reiterated these concerns, but pragmatically observed that where 
a state penal system is involved, as we have here, "federal 
courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the 
appropriate prison authorities."  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
85 (1986).  Nonetheless, the Court also recognized the importance 
of the right to religious worship, even as to state or federal 
prisoners.  The Court perceived that all prisoners must be 
afforded reasonable opportunities to "exercise the religious 
freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."  Cruz 
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). 
     In Turner, 482 U.S. at 93, and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987), the Court held that a prison regulation 
may validly impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights if it is 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.  A court 
may look to several factors in making its determination including 
the connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate 
governmental interest justifying the regulation, and whether 
there are alternative means open for the prisoner to exercise the 
right.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.  The court may also take into 
consideration the impact that accommodation of the constitutional 
right will have on prison resources and personnel.  Id. at 90. 
     In the instant case, the district court held that SCI- 
Huntingdon's policy of permitting only one Muslim service was 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.  It 
noted the institution's budgetary and space limitations, and the 
alternative Muslim services open to the Inmates.  Thus, under the 
standards set forth in Turner and O'Lone, the court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants. 
     Although the district court may have correctly applied the 
standards established in Turner and O'Lone, Congress enacted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 to legislatively 
overrule the Supreme Court's standard of review of religious 
claims as set forth in those cases.  Through RFRA, Congress 
intended to "restore the compelling interest test . . . and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened."  42 U.S.C § 
2000bb(b)(1)(Supp. 1996).  Although the Inmates may not have 
mentioned RFRA in their amended complaint, they did refer to it 
in their opposition-brief to the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and in their motion for a second amendment to their 
complaint.  The Act was in force and as it was the applicable 
law, the district court was required to apply the compelling 
interest test to the facts of the instant case, particularly 
since it had been called to its attention.  As Judge Pollak 
aptly observed in Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215, 216 (E.D. 
Pa. 1995), "RFRA is the law regardless of whether parties mention 
it."  We therefore hold that RFRA, being in effect at the time 
the district court heard this case, should have been considered 
by the district court before entering summary judgment. 
 
 
                              III.   
     RFRA provides, in pertinent part: 
              (a) IN GENERAL.--Government shall not 
         substantially burden a person's exercise of religion 
         even if the burden results from a rule of general 
         applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). 
              (b) EXCEPTION.--Government may substantially  
         burden a person's exercise of religion only if it 
         demonstrates  that application of the burden to the 
         person-- 
              (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
         interest; and 
              (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering  
         that compelling governmental interest. 
 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. 1996).  We agree with other courts of 
appeal that have interpreted RFRA to hold that the Act applies to 
the claims of prisoners.  See, e.g., Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 
1476, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Thomas v. McCotter, 115 S. 
Ct. 2625 (1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
     Thus, the first question to be determined under RFRA is 
whether the State has substantially burdened the Inmate's 
exercise of religion; and, if so, whether the State can justify 
the imposition of that burden.  Although the district court did 
not believe it need reach the Inmates' RFRA claim, it apparently 
decided to address the issue.  The court concluded that the 
Inmates' claim did not implicate the Act.  It adopted the 
magistrate judge's recommendation, which stated that the Inmates: 
         have not alleged that the government has "burdened" 
         their exercise of religion.  Rather they [complain] 
         that the government has not taken affirmative steps to 
         provide them with a place to worship. . . . 
         Accordingly, because the Act restricts only burdensplaced upon 
the exercise of religion, it is not 
         applicable to this claim of failure to provide the 
         plaintiffs with a worship service of their choice. 
 
Thus, the court found that the Inmates had not proven that the 
State has substantially burdened their exercise of religion under 
the Act. 
     In their objections to the magistrate judge's report, the 
Inmates claimed that their rights to free exercise of their 
religion have been substantially burdened by the defendants 
because they are compelled to attend Jummah and Taleem services 
that are led by the American Muslim Mission, which has different 
practices, teachings, dress codes, and Imams.  The American 
Muslim Mission's spiritual leader is Imam Wallace Deem Muhammad, 
who they assert does not follow the four (4) Schools of Thought 
of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.  The Inmates maintain that the 
American Muslim Mission's "teachings and beliefs" are "in direct 
contradiction" with their beliefs.  In particular, they claim 
that their religion prohibits them from "being led in Jummah 
prayer by someone who does not follow one of the Four Schools of 
Thought, which the American Muslims do not." 
     Under RFRA, the Inmates are required to show that a 
"substantial burden" to their free exercise of religion has 
resulted from the State's actions.  Goodall v. Stafford County 
Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 706 (1996); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995).  If they establish a 
substantial burden, then the burden of proof shifts to the State 
to show that it has a "compelling interest" in its actions and is 
furthering that interest by the "least restrictive means."  
Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480 n.2; Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 
194, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
     The showing, however, required to prove a substantial 
burden under RFRA seems to be unsettled.  In Werner v. McCotter, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals provided the following summary 
of standards which seem to be applicable under RFRA: 
         To exceed the "substantial burden" threshold, 
         government regulation must significantly 
         inhibit or constrain conduct or expression 
         that manifests some central tenet of a 
         prisoner's individual beliefs; must 
         meaningfully curtail a prisoner's ability to 
         express adherence to his or her faith; or 
         must deny a prisoner reasonable opportunities 
         to engage in those activities that are 
         fundamental to a prisoner's religion. 
 
49 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted); see also Bryant v. Gomez, 46 
F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (to survive summary judgment under 
"substantial burden" test, plaintiff must prove facts that "show 
that the activities which he wishes to engage in are mandated by 
[his] religion.") 
     In the instant case, the district court concluded that the 
State had not burdened the Inmates' free exercise of religion 
because the Inmates alleged only that the prison institution had 
not taken any affirmative action and had not provided them with 
the separate facilities that they requested and considered 
necessary for worship.  We agree that the State does not have an 
affirmative duty to provide every prison inmate with the clergy 
person or the service of his choice.  Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 
F.2d 1, 4-5 (3d Cir. 1970).  However, an opportunity to worship 
as a congregation by a substantial number of prisoners may be a 
basic religious experience and, therefore, a fundamental exercise 
of religion by a bona fide religious group. 
         The exercise of religion commonly involves 
         group worship, and when the only option 
         available for a prisoner is under the 
         guidance of someone whose beliefs are 
         significantly different from or obnoxious to 
         his, the prisoner has been effectively denied 
         the opportunity for group worship and the 
         result may amount to a substantial burden on 
         the exercise of his religion.  See SapaNajin 
         v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463, 464-65 (8th Cir. 
         1988).  
 
Weir v. Nix, 890 F. Supp. 769, 788 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (citations 
omitted).  The failure to provide otherwise available facilities 
may therefore be, depending on whether it is compelled, as 
substantial a burden on that right as would the removal of 
pertinent facilities from actual congregational worship.  It may 
meaningfully bar their ability to express adherence to their 
faith. 
     Here, the Inmates claimed to have significant ideological 
differences with other Muslim sects, and that the prison's 
insistence on requiring all Muslims to worship collectively 
places a burden on their free exercise of religion.  In 
particular, they urge that their faith "mandates" that they not 
be led in worship by a non-Sunni Muslim.  On the other hand, the 
defendants assert that they have been informed by a reliable 
Muslim authority that the Inmates can comply with their religious 
faith if they worship in a combined service with other Muslims.  
With this factual and material issue in serious dispute, we do 
not believe that it can be determined on a motion for summary 
judgment, particularly with the compelling standard now 
prescribed by RFRA. 
     Even if the Inmates are able to establish that their 
religious right to worship has been substantially burdened by the 
defendants' inaction, this is not the end of the matter.  A 
remaining question is whether conditions and circumstances at the 
prison compel the combined worship service and whether the action 
taken by the prison authorities is the least restrictive means of 
furthering the alleged compelling governmental interest.  
Although the State may have a compelling interest in operating an 
efficient and reasonably cost driven penal institution, the 
Inmates dispute whether the prison officials have taken the least 
restrictive measures in furthering that interest.  Prison 
officials may not take shelter in the mere words of "security" 
and "lack of funds";  they must substantiate the permissibility 
of their conduct under the statute.  The disputes of material 
fact do not permit a trial court to resolve them on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
      
                               IV. 
     In summary, we hold that RFRA was the law of the land when 
the Inmates filed their complaint and that it applies to State 
and Federal prisons.  The Inmates therefore were entitled to 
amend their complaint accordingly.  We further hold that under 
RFRA the compelling interest standard applies to a claim charging 
state prison officials with substantially burdening the rights of 
prisoners to the free exercise of their religion.  Therefore, the 
district court should not have decided genuine issues of material 
fact by summary judgment when it concluded that RFRA was 
inapplicable to the Inmates' claims.  Accordingly, the judgment 
of the district court will be vacated and the case remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
     Each side to bear its own costs. 
 
